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Abstract 
Building the new Oil and Gas Pipelines (OGPs) without analyzing the potential Risk Factors (RFs) that influence the safety of these pipelines 
causes time and cost overrun in these projects. Quantifying the impact of the RFs on the duration of the projects is essential to provide an accurate 
estimate about the project duration and recognize the potential RFs that causing delay and safety issues in the projects. Identifying the RFs in the 
projects via literature review and analyzing their impact on the delivery time of the projects via a questionnaire survey and computer-based risk 
analysis model are the key methods adopted in the study. This study uses the Monte Carlo Simulation algorithm, which is integrated within 
@Risk Simulator to quantify the delay impact of the RFs. The @Risk simulator has the flexibility to integrated different risk distribution methods 
for each RF, which helps in overcoming the limitations of using ASTA Powerproject risk simulator to quantify the delay the projects, as done in 
a prior study. The @Risk simulator is useful in analyzing the delay in each task, working stage and overall project duration. The results provided 
by risk simulator is useful in understanding the sensitivity and the criticality of each RF that might cause delay issues in the projects. The outcomes 
of this study will help to the stakeholders, the decision-makers and the policy-makers of OGP projects to make sound decisions and enable them 
to take preventive actions of risk management while starting a new OGP project, which helps in minimizing the delay in the projects. 
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1. Introduction 
Project management involves making schedules for project 
activities in order to monitor the project’s time progress [1]. In 
the field of construction industry, delay is one of the most 
common problems in the majority of the projects in both 
developed and developing countries [2]. Delay may happen in 
every project during the construction stage, but it varies 
between the different projects and the different countries [3]. 
Understanding the delay factors and their level of impact on a 
project may help to avoid or minimize the project delay [4]. To 
do so, providing good knowledge about the Risk Factors (RFs) 
RFs and using analytical or simulation techniques are the most 
effective methods of risk assessment [5].  
It is essential, therefore, to make an accurate check to quantify 
the impact of the RFs on the duration of new pipeline projects. 
This is because of the current results of risk assessment help in 
making the correct reactions and strategies towards the RFs 
during the planning and construction stages of projects, which 
will help in avoiding and/or minimizing the construction delay 
in these projects. Otherwise, these projects will be subject to 
delay problems, which have a significant impact on a country’s 
economy.  
 
Analyzing the impact of the RFs on the duration of the projects 
at the planning and design stage could help the stakeholders to 
make sound decisions in response to risk management to keep 
the delay interruption in the projects to a minimum, as much as 
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possible. However, there is a lack of studies analyzing and 
quantifying the impact of the RFs on the duration of the projects 
in the developing countries, such as Iraq. Oil and Gas Pipelines 
(OGPs) in Iraq are some of the projects that significantly 
affected by the security situation of the country and suffering 
delay, which make the projects do not deliver at the 
targeted/planned time. Construction delay in OGP projects in 
Iraq obstructs the government’s plans of increasing the oil and 
gas expert rate after 2003, which has a direct impact on the 
economic development and the economic situations of the 
country.  
 
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to develop a Risk 
Management Framework (RMF) which will be used to identify, 
assess, and quantify the impact of the RFs associated with 
OGPs during the construction stage of these projects. The RMF 
will be used to quantify the delay impact caused by the delay 
and RFs and estimate whether or not the projects could be 
delivered on time.  
2. Literature Review  
The literature review revealed that several techniques could be 
used to analyze the risks in construction projects. For instance, 
checklists, interviews with the stakeholders, brainstorming, 
surveys and the Delphi technique. Some of these methods of 
risk and delay analysis are discussed below. 
 
For example, C. Kog  [6] identified and ranked the delay factors 
in construction projects in Portugal, the UK, and the US via 
examining 13 studies about the problem of construction delay 
in these countries. Kadry et al [7] used qualitative documents 
analyses to analyze the delay factors in construction projects in 
16 countries with a high geopolitical risk. These two studies 
were limited to analyzing the delay factors in construction 
projects in the mentioned countries only. As well as, these 
studies did not make any assessment about the delay factors or 
quantify their impact on the projects. For example, they did not 
use any kind of survey, computer modelling or simulation 
methods to analyze the delay factors and quantify their impact 
on project duration.  
 
R. Shah [8] identified the comparative delay factors in 
construction projects in countries such as Australia, Ghana and 
Malaysia via a questionnaire survey and recommended the 
potential measures to reduce their impact on the projects. This 
study has analyzed the possible minimum, the mean and the 
maximum duration of construction projects and the sensitivity 
of the work activities in these projects in the mentioned 
countries. Prasad et al. [9] used a questionnaire survey to 
identify and analyze the delay factors in transportation, power 
and water projects in India. Another questionnaire survey was 
carried out by Chiu and Lai [10] to analyze the frequency and 
the severity levels of the delay factors in the construction of 
electrical projects in Hong Kong. Mpofu  [11] analyzed the 
delay factors in construction projects in the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) via exploring the perceptions of the clients, the 
contractors and the consultants about the delay problem in their 
projects. Shebob et al. [4] analyzed the possible minimum, the 
mean and the maximum duration of a contraction project in 
Libya and the UK using Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS). 
However, the risk assessment methods used in these studies are 
limited to their regions of study, which means they cannot be 
effectively applied to analyze the impact of the delay factors in 
oil and gas projects and improve the level of safety of these 
projects elsewhere. Moreover, the oil and gas industry is 
complex by nature [12]. Oil and gas projects are recognized as 
highly technical projects by nature which are complex, have a 
high level of uncertainty, demand careful risk assessment and 
require appropriate risk management strategies [13]. Therefore, 
managing the RFs in such complex projects, like OGP projects, 
is difficult [14] and requires a high level of experience in risk 
management [15].  
 
M. Fallahnejad [16] used document analysis and a 
questionnaire survey to identify the main delay factors and 
analyze their impact on pipeline projects in Iran. Similarly, 
Sweis et al. [17] used a questionnaire survey to identify the root 
causes of the delay factors in gas pipeline projects in Iran. 
Ruqaishi and Bashir [18] investigated the delay factors in the 
construction of oil and gas projects in Oman. Rui et al [19] 
carried out a comprehensive study to identify the RFs that affect 
the schedule of oil and gas projects in Nigeria. However, the 
risk assessment methods used in these studies are limited to 
their regions of study, which means they cannot be effectively 
applied to analyze the impact of the delay factors in oil and gas 
projects and improve the level of safety of these projects 
elsewhere particularly, where the projects are subject to 
different types of RFs such as security related risks.  
 
In summary, the methods of delay assessments methods as 
discussed above (e.g. using the records, checklists, interviews, 
and surveys) are inactive to make an accurate estimation of the 
delay impact caused by the RFs in OGP project elsewhere. In 
other words, these methods cannot be used to analyze the delay 
in a developing and insecure country like Iraq because of a 
number of the following gaps in knowledge. For example, the 
records about delay and risk factors are either not available or 
not accessible in OGP projects in Iraq and the security level in 
Iraq is low, which makes the projects subject to different types 
of RFs particularly, the risks related to the security situations. 
3. METHODOLOGY  
The aim of this paper is to analyze the potential delay in a case 
study project caused by the associated RFs. The pipeline is 
going to be built in the south of Iraq. The length of the pipe is 
164 km. It links Badra oil and gas field with the export point on 
the Gulf in Basra via Gharraf–An Nassiriyah, see Fig1. This 
project has been under planning since May 21, 2019 and the 
targeted delivery date is January 13, 2023. This means the 
overall duration of the project is estimated as 3 years and 238 
















































As shown in the Fig 2 above, the RMF is structured under three 
main components: inputs (which is about risk identification and 
analysis), process (which is about calculate the risk level in the 
activities of the project) and outputs (which is about the amount 
of delay in the project), as described below.  
1. Inputs, the RFs were identified via an extensive literature 
review about the risks in OGP projects worldwide [21,22]. The 
Risk Probability (RP) and Risk Severity (RS) levels of the RFs 
were assessed via conducting a questionnaire survey of the 
stakeholders in OGP projects in Iraq [23–25]. The results of the 
survey (i.e. the RP and RS levels of the RFs) were used as 
inputs for a computer-based risk assessment model, which used 
the fuzzy theory to calculate the Risk Index (RI) of the RFs 
[25,26]. Table 1 explains the identified RFs and their degree of 
impact on OGP projects in Iraq. 
 
Table 1: The identified RFs and their degree of impact on OGP projects in 
Iraq (the inputs of the RMF). 
The findings of the literature review  The results of 
the survey 
The result 
of the FIS 
RFs  RP* RS^ RI 
Terrorism and sabotage 3.995 4.490 3.99 
Corruption 3.980 4.192 3.87 
Low public legal and moral awareness 3.712 3.859 3.80 
Insecure areas 3.717 4.106 3.76 
Thieves 3.692 4.081 3.75 
Corrosion and lack of protection against it 3.687 3.990 3.72 
Lack of proper training 3.646 3.773 3.71 
Improper safety regulations 3.687 3.949 3.70 
Exposed pipelines 3.667 3.682 3.70 
Improper inspection and maintenance 3.227 3.924 3.69 
Conflicts over land ownership 3.495 3.611 3.68 
Shortage of IT services and modern 
equipment 
3.667 3.652 3.68 
Weak ability to identify and monitor the 
risks 
3.631 3.899 3.67 
Design, construction and material defects 3.333 3.848 3.64 
Lack of risk registration 3.566 3.697 3.60 
Easy access to pipeline 3.631 3.646 3.57 
Limited warning signs 3.626 3.571 3.56 
Little research on this topic 3.621 3.697 3.55 
Lawlessness 3.606 3.682 3.54 
Stakeholders not paying proper attention 3.530 3.143 3.51 
Public poverty and education level 3.449 3.409 3.49 
Inadequate risk management 3.227 3.505 3.48 
Leakage of sensitive information 2.980 3.505 3.38 
Threats to staff 3.323 3.399 3.35 
Operational errors 3.101 3.611 3.30 
Geological risks 2.747 3.182 3.17 
Natural disasters and weather conditions 2.652 3.066 3.10 
Hacker attacks on the operating or control 
systems 
2.237 2.970 3.03 
Vehicular accidents 2.465 2.712 2.80 
Animal accidents 1.894 2.020 1.95 
*In the survey, the probability level of the RFs were calculated using Five-
points Likert Scale, as follows (Almost certain, Likely, Possible, Unlikely and 
Rare) (23). 
^ In the survey, the severity level of the RFs were calculated using Five-
points Likert Scale , as follows (Catastrophic, Major, Moderate, Minor and 
Negligible) (23). 
 
The results of the survey and the computer-based risk 
assessment model indicated that terrorism and sabotage, 
corruption, low public legal and moral awareness, insecure 
areas and thieves are the most critical RFs that affect the safety 
of OGP projects in Iraq. On other hands it was found that the 
RFs that have the less impact on the projects are geological 
risks, natural disasters and weather conditions, hacker attacks 
on the operating or control systems, vehicular accidents and 
animal accidents. 
2. Process, the process part of the RMF focuses on calculating 
the risk levels of the project activities as follows.  
2.1. Allocating the RFs to the project activities. The RFs were 
allocated to the work activities depending on the type of RF and 
the nature of the activity. Professional knowledge was used to 
achieve this task. The subjective and objective analysis of a 
technical report [27] was used to justify the process of risk 
allocation because it explained what was required in each 
activity, the nature of each activity and the potential RFs that 






















Risk Index (RI)Fuzzy Inference System (FIS)
The probability and the severity levels of the RFs
Assess the probability and the severity levels of the RFs (via questionnaire survey )
Allocate the RFs with the work activities of the project
Calculate the total risk in each activity 
Classify the activities of the project based on their level of risk 
 Monte Carlo Simulation (@Risk Simulator)
Start
The amount of delay in the projects caused by the RFs
End
Risk Identification and Analysis 
Risk Allocation 
Literature Review (identify the RFs)
Delay Analysis
Fig. 2. The information flow chart of the Risk Management Framework 
(RMF) adopted in this paper. 
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could affect that activity based on vast experience and a review 
of the construction of OGP projects worldwide.  
2.2. Calculate the Total Activity Risk (TAR) each activity 
using equation 1. 
The TAR calculates the summation of the RI values of the 
RFs allocated to the project activities. 
𝑻𝑨𝑹 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒚 =
⅀𝑹𝑰 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝑹𝑭𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒚     (Equation 
1) 
2.3. Calculate the Total Activity Risk Ratio (TARR) of the 
activity from 100% using equation 2. 
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑅 (100%) =  
𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦
⅀𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑋 100% 
 (Equation 2) 
2.4. Classify the project activities based on their level of risk 
as follows.  
2.5. The activities with [0-1] total risk were considered as 
Very Low (VL) risk activities; the activities with [1-2] total 
risk have a Low (L) risk; those with [2-3] total risk have a 
Moderate (M) risk; those with [3-4] total risk have a High (H) 
risk; and those with [4-5] total risk have a Very High (VH) 
risk. Based on the risk level of the activity, this paper has set 
up five different levels of risk variation on the duration of the 
project as shown in Table 2. 







The impact level 




18.11 0.86 VL 95% - 105% 
Life-cycle plan 71.8 3.41 H 80% - 120% 
Choosing the route 76.65 3.64 H 80% - 120% 
Route approval 73.14 3.47 H 80% - 120% 
Design and 
development 
43.44 2.06 M 85% -115% 
Installation procedure 29.28 1.39 L 90% - 110% 
Risk assessment  49.67 2.36 M 85% -115% 
Time schedule 22.08 1.05 L 90% - 110% 
Cost estimation  22.08 1.05 L 90% - 110% 
Communications  25.43 1.21 L 90% - 110% 
Materials order 18.41 0.87 VL 95% - 105% 
Survey, staking and 
setting out 
75.77 3.60 H 80% - 120% 
Clearing and grading 
the right-of-way 
73.46 3.49 H 80% - 120% 
Topsoil stripping  57.88 2.75 M 85% -115% 
Buildings, roads and 
river crossings 
76.63 3.64 H 80% - 120% 
Pipe transportation to 
site 
59.02 2.80 M 85% -115% 
Temporary fencing 
and signage 
51.09 2.43 M 85% -115% 
Trenching  54.05 2.57 M 85% -115% 
Temporary erosion 
control and side 
support 
57.48 2.73 M 85% -115% 
Pipe set-up   43.84 2.08 M 85% -115% 
NDT tests  32.77 1.56 L 90% - 110% 
Welding, fabrication 
and installing  
36.28 1.72 L 90% - 110% 
Sandblast 32.82 1.56 L 90% - 110% 
Painting 32.81 1.56 L 90% - 110% 
Coating  54.69 2.60 M 85% -115% 
Lowering pipe and 
backfilling 
46.71 2.22 M 85% -115% 
Cathodic protection of 
the pipe 
68.64 3.26 H 80% - 120% 
Final fitting 32.61 1.55 L 90% - 110% 
As-built survey 32.48 1.54 L 90% - 110% 
Hydro, pressure test 29.1 1.38 L 90% - 110% 
Backfilling 36.16 1.72 L 90% - 110% 
Fencing and signage 61.49 2.92 M 85% -115% 
Final clean-up  40.11 1.90 L 90% - 110% 
Right-of-way 
reclamation 
54.03 2.57 M 85% -115% 
Safety barriers 55.53 2.64 M 85% -115% 
Operation within 
design limits 
97.54 4.63 VH 75% - 125% 
Commissioning 
operation value 




29.26 1.39 L 90% - 110% 
Enhanced performance 
and efficiency 
97.54 4.63 VH 75% - 125% 
Monitoring and 
inspection  
42.57 2.02 M 85% -115% 
Maintenance  59.54 2.83 H 80% - 120% 
Risk control 36.31 1.72 L 90% - 110% 
3. Outputs, this section explains how Monte Carlo Simulation 
(MCS) works to simulate the impact RFs on the duration of the 
project. After allocating the RFs to the work activities of the 
project, MCS will calculate the duration of each activity by 
applying the iterations between the minimum and maximum 
duration of the using @Risk Simulator. The initial planned 
duration of the project was 3 years and 238 days (1334 days). 
After analyzing the potential RFs that affect the work activities 
of the project, it was found that the average delay in the project 
is 1374.94 days, which means the delay in the project is 40.94 
















Moreover, @Risk could be used to analyze the delay in the 
duration of the individual activities of the project after 
considering the impact of the associated RFs. The results 
revealed that the activities with the highest delay in the project 
are the hydro and pressure test, the as‐built survey, the 
Fig. 3. The results of simulating the duration of the project. 
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trenching activity, the cathodic protection of the pipe, the 
temporary fencing and signage and of the sand blast activities, 
with a potential delay of 142.07 days, 137.04 days, 80.17 days, 
57.62 days, 53.71 days and 47.88, respectively (see Table 3). 
4. Findings and Discussion   
In conditions of data scarcity, the RFs will be mainly identified 
based on the literature review. Therefore, the RFs in OGP 
projects were identified based on an extensive and worldwide 
literature review about the risks that affect the safety of the 
pipelines. Based on the investigations of literature review, thirty 
RFs were identified in the projects and. The findings of the 
literature review in order to overcome the problem of data 
scarcity about the RFs in OGP projects in Iraq, which represent 
the first finding and contribution of this paper.  
 
The second finding and contribution of this paper come from 
analyzing the RP and RS levels of the RFs based on a 
questionnaire survey that reflect the reality of the problems after 
engaging with the stakeholders in the projects. However, there 
is a potential problem associated with assessing the RFs 
depending on the stakeholders’ judgement only, as they may 
not always yield to a consistent and accurate ranking of the RFs 
[28]. This is because the stakeholders have different views of 
the impact levels of the RFs [29].  
 
Table 3: The duration and the potential delay of the activities of the project.  







= median – 
planned duration  
Concept and definitions  60 81.82 21.82 
Life-cycle plan  60 82.56 22.56 
Choosing the route(s)  90 136.40 46.40 
Route(s) approval  90 128.53 46.4 










Risk assessment and 




Time schedule  45 61.24 38.56 










Materials order activity 30 6.01 -23.99 
Clearing and grading the 




Topsoil stripping and front-














Pipe transporting to sit  90 22.43 -67.57 
Trenching  60 140.17 80.17 
Temporary erosion control 




Pipe set‐up  99 91.73 -7.27 
Welding, fabrication and 




NDT tests  100 147.66 47.66 
Sand blast  100 147.88 47.88 
Painting  100 147.72 47.72 
Cathodic protecting the pipe  90 147.62 57.62 
Coating  100 131.84 31.84 





As‐built survey  10 147.04 137.04 
Final fitting  100 14.28 -114.28 
Hydro pressure test  5 147.07 142.07 
Backfilling  30 6.04 -23.96 
Fencing and signage  14 41.65 27.65 
Final clean-up  21 17.19 -3.81 
Right-of-way reclamation  29 28.31 -0.69 
Safety barriers  29 38.42 9.42 
Fencing and signage  41 70.79 29.79 
 
Moreover, assessing and ranking the RFs in the projects based 
only on the results of the survey could cause inaccurate ranking 
of the RFs. For example, an RF with a high value of RS could 
still be considered as a critical RF that needs to be dealt with a 
matter of urgency. However, the same RF could not come at the 
top of the ranking if it had a low RP. This is similar if the RP of 
the RF is high and the RS is low, which is one of the limitations 
of the traditional risk assessment methods. Therefore, in order 
to reduce the uncertainty associated with analyzing the RFs, the 
calculation of the degree of impact of the RFs on the OGP 
projects will be performed using the fuzz theory [30]. The fuzzy 
uses approximate ranges rather than exact values of processing 
and controls. In other words, the use of ranges of very low, low, 
moderate, high and very high risk, the interpolation between 
these ranges, and the aggregate results of RP and RS of the RFs 
have helped in reducing the uncertainty of calculating the RI 
values of the RFs, which represent the third finding and 
contribution of this paper [31].    
 
After identifying the RFs that might affect the safety of the 
pipelines and analyzing their degree of impact on the projects, 
this paper has allocated the RFs to activities of the projects 
based on the nature of the RFs and the activities. Then, equation 
1 and 2 were used to calculate the amount of risk and level of 
risk in each activity of the project. This represent the fourth 
finding and contribution of this paper, which help the 
stakeholders in the projects to identify the RFs and activities 
that have the highest impact on the duration of the project. 
 
MCS integrated with @Risk simulator was used to quantify the 
delay impact of the RFs on the duration of the project. The 
results of MCS explained that the minimum and maximum 
duration of the project are 1329.30 days and 1441.84 days, 
respectively. The project has a 5% chance of being completed 
between 1329.30 and 1349.1 days or between 1404.5 days and 
1441.84 days. The project has a 90% probability of being 
finished between 1349.1 days and 1404.5 days. The median 
duration of the project is 1374.94 days, which means that the 
project has a 50% probability of being completed in this 
duration, which means the delay in the project is 40.94 days, 
see Fig 3, which is the main finding of this paper. 
 
@Risk simulator helps to apply different distribution methods 
for each RF and activity at the same time, which will enhance 
the risk simulation results and add more confidence regarding 
the project completion probability. Applying different risk 
simulation methods for risk simulation make the results of risk 
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analysis different. For example, [32] used MCS integrated with 
ASTA Powerproject software to analyze the RFs that cause 
delay in the same project. ASTA Powerproject has only four 
methods of risk distribution (which are uniform, normal, 
skewed normal and skewed triangular distribution), but only 
one distribution method could be applied on time during the 
process of risk simulation, which does not reflect the reality of 
the RFs on the duration of the projects. As different RFs have 
different impact of the activities of the projects. This is one of 
the limitations of using ASTA Powerproject quantifies the 
impact of the RFs on the duration of the projects. As well as, 
ASTA Powerproject software could not be used to analyze the 
delay in the different stages of the projects.  
 
In summary, compared to the ASTA Powerproject, @Risk 
simulator is a more useful and powerful tool to analyze the RFs 
and the project delay. This is because @Risk can use more and 
different risk distribution methods than ASTA. Moreover, it 
could be used to analyze the delay in the duration of the 
individual activities, by the stages of the projects and by the 
overall duration of the projects. Meanwhile, the ASTA risk 
simulator is useful to analyze the delay that affects the overall 
duration of the projects only. Table 4 summarizes the results of 
the ASTA Powerproject and the @Risk simulator.  
Table 4: The difference in using the ASTA risk simulator and 
the @Risk simulator to analyse the delay in the project.   
 
Program   Results (delay) Reference  
ASTA risk 
simulator  
14 – 15 days (using four different 
distribution methods) 
[32] 
@Risk simulator 41 days This study 
The difference in the results of ASTA and @Risk is because the 
ASTA Powerproject applies one risk distribution method for all 
RFs and project activities at a time, which makes the RFs and 
the project activities give the same impact regarding the 
duration of the project, which is not accurate. On the other side, 
the @Risk Simulator applies different risk distribution methods 
for the RFs and the project activities, rather than one 
distribution method at a time, with a degree of impact on the 
duration of the project. For example, Risk Triang (0,0.7,1) 
distribution was assigned to the stealing the products and the 
materials RFs, which is different from assigning Uniform, 
Normal, Triangular or Skewed Triangular with no degree of 
impact on the duration of the project, as done in ASTA [32]. 
Assigning different risk distribution methods for the RFs and 
the project activities with a degree of impact on the duration of 
the project was the reason behind the difference in the results 
of ASTA and @Risk.  
5. CONCLUSION  
After considering the impact of the RFs on the duration of the 
project, it was found that the potential delay in the project is 41 
days. The activities that have the highest impact on the duration 
of the project are hydro and pressure test, the as‐built survey, 
the trenching activity, the cathodic protection of the pipe, the 
temporary fencing and signage and of the sand blast activities. 
The advantage of using the @Risk simulator rather than the 
ASTA risk simulator is that the @Risk simulator has more 
flexibility in applying different risk distribution methods for the 
same RFs and work activities at the same time. Additionally, 
the @Risk simulator could help the researchers to analyze the 
delay by the activities of the project, which could not been done 
using the ASTA risk simulator. 
This research has developed a systematic and integrated RMF, 
which was useful to quantify the delay impact in the OGP 
projects. The RMF designed in this study was used to provide 
a wide range of knowledge about identifying the RFs and 
analyzing their impact on OGP projects is a systematic and 
accurate way. The RMF that designed in this paper is a useful 
tool that could be used to analyze the construction delay in OGP 
during the planning and design stage of these projects. 
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